A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY IN AMERICA’S CITIES

December 2001

The United States Conference of Mayors
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The United States Conference of Mayors

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BACKGROUND

On September 11 the world witnessed an attack on America then watched as the Mayor of New York City stepped into the most critical leadership role imaginable. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani reassured the people of his city, and cities across the nation, that everything that could be done was being done to rescue victims, guard against additional loss of life, attend to the injured, comfort victims’ families, and restore a sense of order and security to a city that had experienced the most devastating terrorist attack in our history.

In the weeks since that attack, mayors across the nation have been mobilizing the local resources that would be needed to protect their citizens in the event of further terrorist activity. Under the leadership of the President of The U.S. Conference of Mayors, New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial, they have also been engaged in critical examinations of the local, state and federal resources and the security infrastructure that exist to do this.

Through the years, mayors and public safety officials have consistently attached a high priority to preparing themselves, their personnel and their citizens for the possibility of disasters; this was illustrated just two years ago as cities prepared for the Y2K transition and the potential problems it posed. All cities have plans in place to minimize damage and save lives should a disaster strike. In recent years, the threat of domestic terrorism and, specifically, the threat of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction, has become a more serious concern for mayors as the leaders of their communities, and for police, fire and emergency medical officials as first responders in emergencies large and small. This concern has translated into efforts by the Conference of Mayors to raise levels of preparedness, including a project specifically addressing responses to weapons of mass destruction, creation of a mayors’ training institute, and discussions of preparedness issues – among mayors and with top federal officials – at national Conference of Mayors meetings.

Now, in the wake of September 11 and the anthrax mailings that have since taken lives in several cities and disrupted the work of all three branches of the federal government in Washington, local preparations for disasters of all types and on all scales have been given the highest priority, and guarding against terrorist acts, in particular, is recognized as a critical need. Efforts to strengthen comprehensive emergency management plans have redoubled and there have been major deployments of police and other local public safety resources. All of this is occurring at significant additional cost to local treasuries and at a time when tax revenues being generated by local economies are dropping – in large part because of problems and anxiety created by the terrorist attack.

As they always have done in times of crises, mayors have assumed visible leadership roles, both in their cities and throughout their metropolitan regions. Now, as the nation recovers from the tragedy of September 11, responding both diplomatically and militarily to the terrorist network responsible for it, America’s mayors stand ready on the domestic front lines to assist in every way possible – the “domestic troops” in the war on terrorism, as Conference President Morial has often stated.
MAYORS’ SUMMIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Within 36 hours of the terrorist attack, Conference of Mayors President Marc Morial issued a call for the federalization of all airport security screening services. The mayors’ organization quickly formed bipartisan task forces on airport security, coordination of federal and local law enforcement, and water system security. It also conducted two national webcasts on biological and chemical terrorism, and its executive committee held regular conference calls to guide the organization’s overall response – a response that included a Mayors Emergency Safety and Security Summit held October 23-25 in Washington. This event brought together more than 200 mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs, emergency managers and public health officials from cities across the nation for briefings by top federal officials and for the sharing of information on “best practices” in safety and security.

This document, *A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities*, is the product of this national summit and contains the recommendations of the summit participants in four priority areas: transportation security, emergency preparedness, federal-local law enforcement, and economic security.

It is important to understand that while the fourth area, economic security, is viewed as the ultimate goal for the nation, it is that cannot be achieved in the absence of the first three. That is, securing our transportation system, maximizing our emergency response capability and coordinating our law enforcement response to threats and incidents at all levels are viewed as prerequisites to eliminating the anxiety that has accelerated the nation’s economic downturn, and to achieving economic security for the nation.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

The fact that the U.S. was attacked by terrorists who were able to use our own commercial aircraft as enormously lethal weapons forced the federal government to take quick, decisive action – to ground all but military aircraft and close all U.S. airports until an acceptable level of security for air travelers could be assured. The use of our aircraft as weapons focused the nation’s attention initially on threats to security in the air, but government leaders at all levels understand that in dealing with terrorism, the nation cannot focus on what has happened at the expense of planning for what could happen.

Transportation security in the U.S. must be maintained in the air and on the rails, highways and waterways. Mayors are owners and/or operators of many of the major transportation facilities and systems in the nation or they participate in their governance, and it is on the basis of this experience that recommendations in this area are made.
Airport Security

Based on a series of tele-conferences involving the mayors of the nation’s 29 hub airport cities, recommendations on airport security were drafted by members of the Conference of Mayors Task Force on Airport Security, chaired by Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn, and adopted as official policy by the Conference’s executive committee prior to the summit. They are the following:

Provide a Fully Federalized Force at Points of Passenger, Baggage and Cargo Inspections

- A special entity should supervise federal personnel and implement personnel rules that reflect the need for the highest levels of security and performance. It should set uniform security standards for all airports and manage the financing of federalized airport security screening and related functions.
- The governing board of this entity should consist of key federal agencies, airline representatives, security experts and mayors with direct supervision and control over airports. For most of the nation’s airports, mayors have ownership and/or direct management responsibilities.
- Initial funding should be provided from general revenues, phasing into a user-funded trust fund to finance annualized costs of the federalized system.
- There must be funding assurances (i.e., budget firewalls) and funding commitments sufficient to fully staff these functions in order to minimize delays and facilitate through-put – as contrasted with other federally-directed functions such as the INS and Customs Service where inadequate funding for personnel and other accounts have added to system congestion and inefficiencies.

Provide Airports with Immediate Funding to Pay for Increased Security

- Airports should receive federal reimbursement for the additional costs of security measures mandated by the FAA on September 12 to cover costs already accrued as well as costs of ongoing compliance.

Provide Federal Assistance and Guarantees to Ensure Airport Financial Stability

- Airports should be granted temporary flexibility in the use of Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) and the FAA’s Airport Improvement Program (AIP) funds. In addition to providing airports with more flexibility in the temporary use of PFC and AIP funds for additional security costs – a currently prohibited use – this change should allow the temporary use of these fund sources to keep current on outstanding debt obligations, where this need exists. This change, however, should not be a substitute for additional federal funds. In the long run, it is vital that PFC and AIP funds be reserved for needed airport capital improvements.
- Airlines must continue paying landing fees and airport rents – funding sources that are crucial to maintaining the financial integrity of the nation’s airports. More than $70 million of
cumulative outstanding debt as well as billions more in planned new issues to finance airport expansion plans have been affected by the current instability of the nation’s airlines and airports.

- Confidence in airport bonds must be reinforced, particularly in light of disturbing actions such as the recent decision by Standard & Poor’s to place all of its North American airports on its CreditWatch.
- There must be FAA flexibility regarding new controls affecting airport facilities such as parking structures and non-ticketed passenger access to terminals – this because of the financial and other effects of the uniform application of new federal security standards on airport revenues and operations.
- The continuation of needed airport modernization and improvement efforts – including airport security technological advancements and provision of safer and more secure air terminals, runways and parking facilities – should be ensured. This is critical to airline and passenger safety and security, as well as to meeting the nation’s air transportation infrastructure/capacity requirements.

**Provide Airline Workforce Protection and Relief for Affected Businesses**

- Airline workers and other workers directly affected by declining air travel should be extended targeted benefits – including unemployment benefits, supplemental loans and other income support assistance – as well as specialized training. Persons in airline-related occupations should be given the opportunity to serve as workers in a federalized system of airport security screening.
- Affected businesses, particularly on-airport businesses, should be extended special targeted relief including federal loan assistance and payment assistance to keep current on airport rents, lease payments and other fixed monthly costs, and special tax relief to provide support through this period of reduced air travel.

**Support Airside Improvements**

- The air marshal program should be expanded and we should move toward a system in which program costs, along with the costs of a federalized screening system, are funded by a dedicated federal user fee, excise tax or other revenue source.
- Interim funding is needed to retrofit cockpit doors and make other improvements required to fortify aircraft now in service.
- Security for access to aircraft and other airside operations in secure areas of airports should be strengthened. This is regarded as an issue of critical importance.

**Impose Airspace Restrictions and Heightened Security on All General Aviation and Charter Flights Throughout the U.S.**

- Security procedures and requirements for general aviation – both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters – should be as stringent as they are for commercial aviation. Airspace restrictions
should be tightened in and around commercial business districts, sports arenas and other populated areas.

**Resume Full Operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport**

- Full operations at National Airport should be restored as soon as possible in light of the impact that current limitations are having on the airline industry overall and on the economies of East Coast markets in general and the Capitol region in particular.

**Luggage Screening**

Further Task Force discussions during the summit resulted in a recommendation that the federal government immediately mandate the screening of all checked luggage. Mayors believe that federal government work with manufacturers of effective screening machines in order to license and expedite the production of new machines must be considered an urgent national priority.

Screening of 100 percent of checked luggage requires:

- full utilization of all existing screening machines;
- installation of all operable CTX machines that the FAA has been warehousing;
- funding for airport facility expansion to accommodate additional detection machines;
- funding for new machines;
- hand inspection of all luggage not machine screened until a sufficient number of screening machines is available;
- funding for additional airport building modifications to accommodate hand inspections;
- temporary adjustments to airline scheduling to reduce congestion caused by baggage screening; and
- immediately mandating the matching of loaded baggage with boarded passengers.

**Aviation Security Legislation**

One month following the summit, Congress enacted, and the President signed, aviation security legislation containing several of the provisions sought by the mayors. One of the key provisions, and one of the top priorities of the Conference of Mayors, is the requirement that airport security screening be federalized within one year. The Conference of Mayors will work closely with the Administration and the Congress to ensure that all deadlines in the bill, particularly those relating to passenger and baggage screening, are met.

**Transit Security**

With more than nine billion trips logged on the nation’s public transit systems each year, securing these systems and protecting riders from potential terrorist activities ranks as a high
priority. Public transit includes buses and vans, trains and light rail and ferry boats. Several actions can be taken to help secure these systems without compromising their ability to meet the growing demand for public transit services. Federal resources are needed for:

- additional personnel on train platforms, on rolling stock, and in and around transit facilities; needs include new personnel, payment for overtime hours, and reassignment of law enforcement officers;
- deployment of new security and communications technologies such as video surveillance and locator systems to enhance safety and transit system performance;
- infrastructure improvements including secure transit control facilities, fencing and barriers, and other means of protection for transit assets and users; and
- expansion, modernization and rehabilitation of transit infrastructure – both facilities and rolling stock – to strengthen transit capacities that become critically important in the event of future terrorist incidents or other catastrophic events.

Federal resources should be directed to these needs through existing programs of the Federal Transit Administration, thus ensuring that funds are distributed consistent with current law – i.e., 55 percent through formula grants, 45 percent through discretionary grants – to ensure balanced investment in all transit needs. And these needs should be incorporated into the FTA program as eligible expenditures so that any additional FY 2002 funds provided as part of a stimulus package or through other legislation could be applied to them.

Highway Security

The nation’s highway networks contain more than four million miles of roads and streets and thousands of bridges and other facilities. Ensuring that these assets are secure is now seen as one of the nation’s greatest challenges.

- Investment in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) should be increased immediately. This would aid in the deployment of both proven and new technology to increase the security of the surface networks. It would improve the information provided to travelers in order to smooth traffic flows and speed evacuations during periods of threats to, or disruptions of, these networks. ITS can be deployed immediately and is extremely flexible, as the basic systems can serve multiple modes.

- Regarding future highway investment policy, focusing on system preservation and system performance is considered to be one of the most effective ways to address future security threats.
**Rail Security**

**Passenger Rail**

Following the September 11 attack, Amtrak, the nation’s inter-city passenger rail corporation, took immediate steps to secure its train operations and infrastructure in order to provide for the safe passage of riders. Since that initial action, Amtrak has reviewed every aspect of its safety and security procedures and has determined that several specific upgrades need to be made immediately.

An Amtrak security and safety plan proposes a series of specific actions to harden potential terrorist targets, and the Conference of Mayors supports an emergency rail investment package to cover Amtrak’s security, safety and capacity needs. Key components of the plan are:

- **Security** – to secure infrastructure (lighting, fencing, alarms and access control for tunnels, bridges, interlockings, track, yards and facilities) and equipment (satellite communications on trains, head-end surveillance, en route train security and bomb detectors). Funds would be used to hire patrol officers, security officers, specialized personnel and bomb-trained canine teams. Aviation units would be established to provide air support and protection for trains and Amtrak locations.

- **Life Safety** – to complete the entire life safety program in New York City and to rehabilitate existing Baltimore and Washington, D.C. tunnels.

- **Infrastructure Capacity** – to enhance reliability and capacity for bridges, track, interlockings, facilities and power; build New York’s Pennsylvania Station access and egress; provide capacity and congestion relief for long distance service; and provide corridor relief for long distance and corridor service through Chicago.

- **Equipment Capacity** – for fleet wreck repair (bringing locomotives and passenger cars out of wreck storage into service), fleet capacity expansion (upgrading locomotives and passenger cars scheduled for retirement, and re-manufacture and overhaul of locomotives, passenger cars and baggage cars), and fleet acquisition to accommodate the increased and sustained demand for Amtrak service since September 11.

**Freight Rail**

Mayors recommend that federal law governing freight rail operations be revised to meet increased security needs.

- Freight railroads should be required to develop new notification procedures and to provide better information to the local jurisdictions through which they will be transporting chemicals and other hazardous materials.
• Improved notification and information should extend to the storage of freight on sidings and to other practices that could pose risks to immediate neighborhoods and major local assets and venues.
• In the interim, freight railroads are strongly urged to continue to meet with local officials on ways to improve communication concerning potentially hazardous cargo or other activity that could result in security risks for communities.

Port Security

Last year U.S. seaports handled over $737 billion in primarily containerized cargo. The nation’s 20 largest ports handle over 95 percent of U.S. international trade. America’s seaports are critical to the movement of commerce throughout the nation and the world and also play an important role in the movement of American military forces.

Several security and anti-terrorism actions were initiated immediately after the September 11 attack by ports across the country. These included: the activation of port security task forces, in conjunction with the Coast Guard, to coordinate national, state and local vessel security and disaster response functions; the halting and boarding of every vessel entering a U.S. port by the Coast Guard; the assurance that National Port Readiness ports will through-put defense-related cargo to meet emerging deployment demands; and the upgrading of vessel and local law enforcement assets and the shifting of these to port and marina control.

The September 11 attack produced a heightened awareness of the vulnerability of America’s seaports and of the importance of guarding them against potential sabotage. Mayors are greatly concerned that while much of the cargo delivered to U.S. cities each day by truck, train and air enters the country initially aboard container ships, a very small percentage of this cargo (some say as little as two percent) is inspected at its port of entry. In the face of terrorist threats, an inadequate inspection system in the nation’s ports puts all of America’s cities in harm’s way. Mayors recommend that:

• Protecting our international seaport borders should be the responsibility of a partnership of federal, state and local governments; seaports, and private industry. Federal funds should be provided for this, along with the flexibility to use them to meet the unique local needs of each port.
• The infrastructure improvement needs of National Port Readiness ports now take on added national security importance and must be addressed.
• Ports must be helped to significantly upgrade personnel identification cards and personnel background investigation capability.
• Because of their expertise in this area, federal agencies must take the lead in assessing ports’ vulnerability to terrorism and work closely with local governments in the process.
• Enhancing communication among ports, local seaport security committees, labor and agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Customs Service would allow the local committees to better focus their efforts within the port area and so improve security.
Though a port has little control over criminal conspiracies or drug interdiction, the local port committee should work closely with the federal agencies that have jurisdiction over such criminal activity.

- In order to more closely monitor cargo flowing in and out of the country, increase local scrutiny of port traffic, and conduct more inspections without slowing the movement of commerce, the U.S. Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and local law enforcement must be given additional resources – vessels, equipment and personnel.
- A federal grant program should be created to enable ports to utilize new technologies and install security enhancements. Under this program, new technologies would be implemented on a case-by-case basis where their need and utility could be demonstrated.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Of the approximately $10 billion federal terrorism budget identified by the Office of Management and Budget, only 4.9 percent is allocated to state and local first response activities. And, of this limited amount, most goes to the states rather than directly to America’s cities and major population centers.

Such a funding scheme is inconsistent with the central leadership roles mayors are called upon to play when a disaster or terrorist incident occurs – reassuring the public that all that can be done is being done; providing the public with accurate and timely information; providing support to the first responders, the public safety and emergency personnel responsible for assisting the victims of an incident, sometimes at great risk to their own safety; and bringing together all available resources – federal, state and local, public and private – to provide the needed response. For mayors in larger metropolitan areas, these central leadership functions often must serve an entire region.

Office of Homeland Security

- Mayors have long been concerned by the multiplicity of federal agencies which have responsibility for helping cities prepare for a possible weapons of mass destruction event, and for the incident and the incident consequences stages of an attack. Mayors want to assist Governor Tom Ridge and the Administration in designing the new Office of Homeland Security, to assure that it is given the significant authority it will need to coordinate and strengthen federal emergency preparedness efforts. Mayors know that major changes will be necessary to achieve the coordination and cooperation necessary to succeed in the fight against terrorism.
- The cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security should be authorized by Congress and the Director should be given budgetary authority over all federal personnel and programs related to the domestic protection of our homeland.
- The Office of Homeland Security must be structured to work directly with mayors in support of their leadership roles and responsibilities in both their cities and their regions.
• A permanent commission consisting of mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs, local emergency managers, and local public health officials should be established immediately by the Director of Homeland Security. This commission is needed to advise on the restructuring of the federal-local partnership with the goal of strengthening domestic safety and security. It is essential that at this time of national crisis, direct lines of communication and assistance be established among the Office of Homeland Security, federal agencies and local governments.

**Reimbursement for Heightened Security**

• As the front line defenders of homeland security and as first responders to terrorist attacks and threats, America’s cities have been incurring extraordinary costs. To ensure that heightened security can be maintained, a new flexible local homeland security block grant should be established. Block grant funds could be used for additional training for police and fire personnel, communications and rescue equipment, and security measures to protect airports, waterways, utilities, public transit and other public infrastructure.

**Metropolitan Emergency Management**

• Flexible funding should be provided to increase the ability of local governments to strategically plan for and respond to emergencies. Funds could be used for full-time disaster coordination; training of first responders; construction and retrofitting of local command and control centers and mobile command vehicles; and to meet disaster equipment needs. The number of local Urban Search and Rescue Teams should be increased and all teams should be fully equipped.

• The federal government should accelerate the development of regional approaches to emergency and disaster management. In addition to financial assistance, a “best practices” program should be provided to build on new ideas and developments in metropolitan coordination. Emergency simulation exercises should be held in major cities throughout the country. Federal, state and local agencies should participate in simulated biological and chemical attack exercises.

• In the event of a catastrophic disaster, most communities will run short of critical emergency response resources (e.g., life-saving equipment, personal protection equipment, respirators, etc.) in six hours, and federal help won’t arrive for 12 hours. Pre-positioned equipment pods should be strategically located throughout the U.S. to resupply local responders. The limited funding now available to the Department of Justice for equipment pods should be increased.

• FEMA’s fire grant program to local governments should be expanded to cover responses to catastrophic disasters.

• Federal resources available to cities in the event of catastrophic disasters should be coordinated and streamlined. Mayors and other local officials should have clear guidelines for the use of resources provided by both federal and state governments when disasters occur. Guidelines should be consistently applied by both FEMA and state emergency management departments.
• When an incident occurs, there should be a single federal point of contact. In addition, local officials need to know which federal agency is in charge or has lead responsibility. Finally, it must be clear how any deployed National Guard troops relate to local authorities.
• National Guard Civil Support Teams have access to second generation biological detection equipment currently not available to civilian responders. This results in delays in the identification of biological agents until National Guard teams respond. This detection technology should be available to first responders.
• The EPA Superfund legislative requirement that all details of local emergency preparedness plans, including the locations and amounts of hazardous substances, be made public (SARA III) should be amended.
• Effective preparedness efforts require an empowered community and the involvement of community representatives in the development of emergency response plans. The public should be educated in basic lifesaving techniques so that bystanders can provide assistance to those injured until help arrives.

Communications/Technology

• There must be communication system inter-operability to ensure clear communication among city departments and federal, regional, state and other local entities responding to disasters. There must be vehicles for communication with the public to alert them to potential threats and provide them timely information on the status and effectiveness of response efforts. Alternative communication mechanisms should be available in the event of power outages or other events that disable the primary communication mechanisms.
• The compatibility, security and reliability of federal, state, regional and local emergency telecommunications systems must be assured, and accomplishing this requires redundancy in the systems available. The telephone system must be capable of disseminating important information to affected or potentially affected populations. A satellite communication system should be available when other communications systems are non-functional.
• Since 911 systems in many cities would be quickly overwhelmed in the event of a weapons of mass destruction incident, existing 911 systems need to be upgraded and 311 systems, or equivalent systems that can handle a large volume of incoming calls from the public and provide up-to-date information or instructions, should be put in place. Additional personnel will be required for 311 systems to operate effectively; without sufficient personnel to take 311 calls, emergency callers will quickly revert to 911.
• The sale of 800 mgHerz radio bands to the private sector should be prohibited. There should be federal support for the development of needed equipment and infrastructure for 800 mgHerz communications systems that would allow communication among EMS, fire and police as well as railroads, public works or other entities that may be involved in an incident.

Protective Equipment/Training – Direct Local Assistance

Cities of all sizes have consistently raised concerns about the lack of availability of equipment such as protective suits, gas masks and detection devices, of protective drugs for first responders,
and of training resources. Thousands of mid-sized and smaller communities have received no
direct assistance in this area. For larger cities that have received some federal assistance,
significant needs remain.

- Under current law, funding for first responder equipment is provided to the states for
distribution to local governments. Mayors strongly believe that, in this time of national crisis,
resources for equipment should be made available directly to local governments.
- Mayors also believe that the federal government should greatly increase resources for
development of a training curriculum specifically for them as the “first responders” to a
weapons of mass destruction terrorist attack. A weapons of mass destruction core curriculum
should be developed for municipalities, counties and states which includes awareness,
operations, technical issues and incident management. Public and environmental health
personnel should be included as first responders and trained as such.
- Good, up-to-date emergency response training programs (such as those provided by the
Department of Justice’s Office of State and Local Support) are available from the federal
government, but funding for these programs needs to be increased so that they can reach
many more local first responders.

Public Health System

It is generally acknowledged that the nation has failed to invest adequately in the local public
health infrastructure, with the result that local public health agencies often lack tools as basic as
computers and Internet connections. Now, in the wake of major terrorist incidents and in the face
of additional terrorist threats, public health infrastructure needs appear enormous.

Coordination

- Resources are needed to conduct active syndromic surveillance for disease, to do immediate
on-the-scene epidemiological investigation, to develop and test local bio-terrorism
preparedness plans, to administer mass immunizations or prophylaxis, to develop an area’s
“surge capacity” in the event of an incident, and to maintain around-the-clock vigilance and
readiness.
- Resources are needed for a network which would improve a local health department’s
response to a weapons of mass destruction emergency by enabling it to coordinate services
with other essential local, state and federal agencies.
- Resources are needed for mass decontamination of ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients
and for training in mass fatality decontamination.
- Current quarantine regulations which usually apply to individuals, not groups, should be
examined. Because it may become necessary to isolate very large numbers of people in order
to prevent the spread of infectious disease, legislation to permit local governments to impose
large scale quarantines should be in force in every state.
• The national poison information system, with its regional poison centers that provide full-time
day-round emergency telephone advice and direction, provides an infrastructure on which to
build a national system to respond to public inquiries concerning health threats.

Communications

• Adequate and secure electronic communication and data analysis systems are needed to
ensure appropriate coordination, communication, and implementation of the public health
disaster preparedness plans which are needed to rapidly mobilize public health workers,
emergency responders, and private health care providers.
• Resources are needed to strengthen local public health system communication with the general
public. Clear communication is necessary to provide important information, allay fears, and
alter behavior so as to reduce risk.

Training

• The federal government should assist in training to increase local public and private capacity
for detection and treatment of biological and chemical agents. Training should be provided to
health care providers and appropriate staffs of hospitals and city agencies, enabling them to
quickly detect a possible incident, identify the symptoms produced by a biological or chemical
agent, and know what steps to take to mitigate adverse public health consequences. Such
training must be tailored to local conditions and matched with follow-up technical assistance.
• There should be one regional training center in each federal region charged with expanding the
training capacity of existing emergency medical training centers.

Personnel

• Environmental health personnel are needed to assess the health risks related to biological and
chemical agents and to minimize threats of illness or death in the event of a terrorist incident.
• Emergency medical personnel trained in infection control are needed in local communities to
respond to increased demand for services and consultation.

Facilities

• Because it is difficult to get hospitals involved in programs without funding to cover their
costs, federal grants to do this (from agencies such as FEMA, HHS and the Department of
Justice) should be available to both public and private hospitals in the health care community.
With overcrowded hospitals increasingly having to turn away patients, the need exists to
expand hospital capacity in general.
• There is no federally- or state-designated “point hospital” for disaster coordination in regions
or localities. While federal and state public health agencies will have ultimate control in a
disaster, a lead emergency medical center should be designated to coordinate hospital services
in a disaster.
• Community health centers should be viewed as an important part of the local public health delivery system and should be included in local planning efforts and in the distribution of resources intended to strengthen the public health infrastructure.
• Military health units should be available when needed to assist local public health agencies in responding to biological and chemical threats and incidents.

**Equipment/Supplies**

• It is critically important that there be adequate national and regional stockpiles of vaccines and therapeutics located close enough to metropolitan centers to permit a quick response to a weapons of mass destruction attack and to protect first response personnel.
• Pharmaceuticals necessary for immediate relief of possible effects of chemical or biological exposure should be provided to first responders and their families.
• A rapid response testing network must be deployed so that highly accurate determinations for biological and chemical agents can be made quickly and without the need to transport specimens to centralized CDC laboratories. Affordable, local or “on-scene” test kits for Anthrax are needed to produce quicker results and allay fears.
• For Metro Medical Response System cities, sustainment funding is needed to replace outdated equipment and provide refresher training.

**Stadium/Arena Security**

• To protect all involved in stadium events, the FAA should continue to restrict the flight of private aircraft over or near stadiums, arenas and other large public venues on the days events are held.
• The Department of Defense should extend financial and personnel assistance to major domestic sporting or entertainment events, as it does for the Olympics, Goodwill Games and other international events.

**Water and Wastewater Security**

Under the leadership of the Urban Water Council, a task force of mayors has been considering the new and expanded efforts that are required to enhance security at water and wastewater treatment facilities. It is clear that emergency preparedness and emergency action plans must be reevaluated, as they can no longer be limited to natural disasters or to catastrophic equipment failure, extended power outages, fires or chemical spills. Plans now must include terrorist and sabotage threats of physical destruction, biological contamination, chemical contamination and cyber attacks.

Professional organizations and government officials have requested federal funding to conduct system assessments and participate in security planning efforts that give utilities the tools they need to improve their security systems and emergency action plans. The intended result includes
revised regulations and procedures, new technologies, equipment, supplies, and training for terrorism defense.

Protecting the nation’s water systems from acts of terrorism requires that the federal government:

• immediately establish a national research and development program for advanced monitoring, detection, and screening technologies and systems;
• provide funding for immediate water system security assessments; and
• assist local governments in preparedness/contingency planning and training to ensure appropriate responses in the event of an attack.

FEDERAL-LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

There are nearly 650,000 police officers in the nation’s cities who stand ready to work with federal agencies to make the nation safer and more secure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has 11,500 agents – far less than the number needed to address the security problems the nation currently faces. In meetings held since September 11, a task force of mayors and police chiefs has called for a new protocol governing how local law enforcement agencies can assist federal agencies, particularly the FBI, given the information needed to do so. A close working partnership of local and federal law enforcement agencies, which includes the sharing of intelligence, will expand and strengthen the nation’s overall ability to prevent and respond to domestic terrorism.

Communication and Coordination

• There must be closer cooperation between local and federal public safety entities. Mayors throughout the nation must be “in the loop” throughout the planning, preparation and execution of public safety initiatives related to anti-terrorism.
• Mayors of the largest cities in each major metropolitan area should be included in the federal district law enforcement task forces convened by the U.S. Attorneys at the direction of the Attorney General. Those mayors could then convene all appropriate representatives of cities in their metropolitan areas and serve as the link to the existing coordinated federal response within the district.
• The USA Patriot Act of 2001 provides for greater sharing of intelligence among federal agencies. It should be amended to include the same kind of intelligence sharing between federal and local law enforcement agencies, as is contained in proposed new legislation.
• We must seed a new system of communication between federal and local public safety officials to create a “24/7” threat assessment capability with appropriate sharing of intelligence on a need-to-know basis.
• Mayors and police chiefs should be allowed to hold the security clearances needed to receive intelligence from the federal level.
• Existing restrictions on local law enforcement access to NCIC data for criminal records checks must be modified. The NCIC system should be updated with as much information as possible, including photographs, visa information, driver’s license information and last known addresses.
• Federal and local intelligence databases should be merged.
• INS warrant information and photographs of persons sought by federal authorities should be provided to local law enforcement agencies.
• The Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act should be fully implemented. At the very least, local telephone companies should be required to adhere to it.
• The nation’s 650,000 local police officers should assist the FBI in tracking down and following up on at least a portion of the tips received, particularly since some of the tips received by the FBI are more appropriately handled by the local police.
• Funding for existing federal law enforcement assistance programs must be increased and made more flexible so that local police departments can use the funds to purchase communications and other equipment needed to prevent and respond to terrorism; pay overtime to officers who are providing increased security for public events, airports, train stations, utilities, infrastructure and other key sites; and hire additional officers where necessary.

**Border City Security**

Literally on the nation’s front lines, border cities play critical roles in our national economy – roles which must not be diminished by efforts to protect the nation against terrorism. Border cities are key to international trade and commerce as the ports-of-entry for goods and produce. Canada is the nation’s top trading partner, Mexico comes next, and 90 percent of cross-border trade occurs by road freight. Border cities are also where many people enter and leave the country, including workers who cross the border on a daily basis traveling to and from their jobs. Crossing the borders are citizens, legal residents, legal migrant workers and legal tourists on visas, along with those who violate our immigration laws and visa regulations.

Protecting the nation’s borders and at the same time preserving their critical role in the nation’s economy requires:

• funding to triple the number of U.S. Customs agents, INS agents and Border Patrol officers;
• federal reimbursement for the costs of providing additional security at border bridges, tunnels and railroad crossings, commensurate with the volume of cross-border traffic at individual points;
• immediate development and implementation of a comprehensive national border surveillance system, including the use of the best available technological means to effectively and efficiently monitor breaches in border security, particularly in less populated areas and other areas in which such surveillance systems currently do not exist;
• to increase safety and security in tunnels and on bridges which cross borders, implementation of “reverse customs inspections;” following this practice, inspections are conducted before rather than after a vehicle uses a tunnel or bridge to cross a border;
• implementation of programs to expedite the entry of low-risk, pre-approved cross-border travelers, such as those commuting to jobs (e.g., PORTPASS and CANPASS);
• accelerated development of technology to expedite the flow of routine cross-border shipments of low-risk cargo by manufacturers, such as the automotive industry in the Detroit area;
• “harmonization” of immigration, trade and security policies in an effort to keep immigrants with links to terrorism from entering the country while at the same time allowing low-risk cargo to flow unimpeded across borders;
• fingerprinting and periodic monitoring of legal guest workers and non-citizen legal residents and other legal immigrants in a manner that will not hamper the legal immigration of workers important to many U.S. industries and local economies;
• additional funding for the INS to permit closer monitoring of visas and temporary passports and to permit entry of visa and passport information into the ICIC network;
• periodic reporting requirements for legal immigrants, to ensure full compliance with the law;
• deportation of violators of visa requirements and immigration law to their countries of origin;
• reform of visa-granting practices and procedures to ensure that, while suspected terrorists cannot slip through, there can be continued immigration by individuals and families with deserving and statutory cases;
• full funding for all cross-border anti-terror and drug enforcement intelligence-sharing activities; and
• full cooperation with Canadian and Mexican law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and the development of integrated responses to potential and pending threats.

ECONOMIC SECURITY

Over the past several weeks we have grappled as never before with terrorism on our soil and have come to understand that the terrorists’ goals include the creation of fear: fear of travel, fear of illness and death, fear of violence – essentially, fear of living a normal life in America. Their ultimate goal appears to be the undermining of the economic stability of our nation.

As stated in the introduction to the mayors’ summit recommendations, meeting the nation’s basic, essential needs for transportation security, emergency preparedness and coordinated law enforcement must be viewed as prerequisites to achieving the goal of national economic security. This means that the costs associated with the recommendations that have been made in these three areas could, and perhaps should, be considered part of the ultimate cost of that economic security – but only a part.

Another prerequisite to economic security for the nation as a whole is help for the people who have been hurt by the economic fallout of the terrorist attack, those whose jobs have been lost in the economic downturn that accelerated following the attack. There is an immediate need for direct worker assistance of various kinds, coupled with a program of strategic public investment that will modernize the nation’s infrastructure in order to improve both our competitiveness and our security.

Worker Assistance
• Unemployment insurance should be expanded to provide benefits to those directly and indirectly affected by disaster-related job loss and unemployment benefits should be extended from 26 to 78 weeks for all workers. Eligibility requirements should be modified to provide equal benefits to those who lost their jobs as a result of the economic downturn but who are ineligible for regular benefits, such as temporary and part-time workers and former Temporary Assistance to Needy Family (TANF) recipients. This would also allow workers to be hired for community service jobs.

• Funding of job training programs for dislocated workers, adults and youth under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) should be sufficient to enable those who are laid off, especially if they are low-skilled workers, to get upgrade training, basic skills training and ESL education.

• Free or low-cost health insurance should be provided to low income families affected by the September 11 attack. Federal subsidies for COBRA for individuals who are unemployed due to the economic downturn should be provided.

• The rescission in the FY 2001 dislocated workers appropriation should be restored.

• It should be recognized that young workers served by WIA, especially those in Youth Opportunity Grant programs, will most likely be the first laid off in a recession, and that many of these youth are high school dropouts who need job training and financial subsidies.

Strategic Public Investment

President Bush has recognized the need for an economic stimulus plan that will pull the nation back from recession and move it closer to economic security. Mayors believe there is a need for a balanced approach to stimulus that recognizes the value of investments in strategic public resources. They believe that investments in sorely needed infrastructure projects offer the nation the benefit of increased employment today and increased productivity, competitiveness and security in the future. And they believe that the most effective investments that can be made today are in the local infrastructure projects that are already planned and can be started quickly – projects that lack only the funding needed to launch them. These could include: traffic system enhancements, transit projects, high-speed rail projects, Amtrak system improvements, repairs to roads and bridges serving metropolitan areas, and water security development projects.

Tax provisions contained in any economic recovery legislation should be short term – 12 to 18 months – and directly targeted to stimulating the economy. Examples include: lifting the cap on state and local tax exempt bonds to spur stalled development; doubling the allocation of low income housing tax credits to advance housing construction; and providing a tax credit to low and moderate income families who purchase computers to boost technology literacy.